Last weekend, Brazil’s former President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, defeated the “Trump of the tropics”, Jair Bolsonaro, to become the next President of Brazil.
Winning by only 50.9 per cent, however, his victory was far from convincing and points to a country more divided than ever, even as it pivots to the left. It has nevertheless been hailed as a big comeback for “Lula”, who had previously been jailed on corruption charges until his conviction was annulled.
In many ways the Lula vs. Bolsonaro divide mirrors other divisions which have come to define Brazil: race, religion, and income. Lula has tended to appeal to the black and mixed-race combined majority, who tend to be poorer and whose focus is mostly on social justice and welfare, as well as a higher proportion of Catholic voters. Bolsonaro has instead tended to appeal to the wealthier white minority who tend to focus more on public order, as well as a growing cohort of Evangelical Protestants, and big business.
Indeed, so great has the religious divide become that Lula felt compelled to make assurances to Evangelical Christians that he would not restrict religious freedoms. Lula also said he was opposed to legalising abortion even though he is perceived to be more liberal on issues such as abortion and LGBT rights than Bolsonaro. In the run-up to the election, one poll by PoderData found that 62 per cent of Evangelical voters backed Bolsonaro, with 38 per cent for Lula, although Lula got the support of a slim majority of Catholics.
This can be seen in the context of a changing religious landscape not just in Brazil but across Latin America. While Brazil remains the second most Catholic country on earth, Catholicism is waning.
The fact same-sex marriage is increasingly recognised across the region, including in Brazil, has demonstrated to many the declining moral power of Catholicism, with Evangelical Christianity winning more adherents as a consequence. According to data from Latinobarómetro – and as reported by Axios – between 2010 and 2020, Brazil’s Catholic population fell from 66 per cent to 55 per cent. By some estimates, it will soon fall below 50 per cent.
While secularism has been a factor in this decline, a perceived failure to address social problems, not least related to law and order as well as moral values, have also been key. Just as the number of Catholics across Latin America fell from 70 per cent to 57 per cent between 2010 and 2020, other forms of Christianity sprang to life. In Brazil, for instance, the number of Evangelical Christians rose from 3 per cent in 2000, to 18 per cent in 2010, and 22 per cent in 2020 (some estimates now put it nearer to 30 per cent).
As argued by Chayenne Polimédio, writing in the Atlantic: “According to a 2016 survey, 54 per cent of the Brazilian population held a high number of traditionally-conservative opinions, up from 49 per cent in 2010. The shift is particularly evident on matters of law and order”. According to Polimédio, the “shift has been accompanied by a massive growth in the country’s Evangelical Protestant and Pentecostal churches”.
Meanwhile, as reported by DW, according to Ricardo Ismael, of the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro: “Many low-income earners and lower-middle-class people felt the promises of the Evangelical neo-Pentecostal churches spoke to them”, while Francisco Borba Ribeiro Neto – of the Catholic University of Sao Paulo – sees the rise of Evangelical Christians as a consequence of a rural exodus in the latter half of the 20th Century, with a religious rural population taking refuge in more conservative Evangelical churches as they encountered a more permissive Catholic urban landscape.
According to Borba Neto: “The Catholic discourse focuses more on social issues, the rights of the poorest in society”, while “the Evangelical discourse – and particularly that of the neo-Pentecostal churches – concentrates on moral values.” Likewise, according to Ismael, neo-Pentecostal churches “concern themselves with moral values, fight against the lack of security in cities and call for an end to the welfare state”.
Of course, the rise of Evangelical Christianity and the decline of Catholicism – one increasingly coming to define the right and the other the left – is not the sole factor behind the schisms in Brazilian society. But the fact that, in Brazil, Catholicism is now associated with social justice more than moral values – and has consequently declined – perhaps offers a warning about the dangers of the kind of liberal pivot some Catholics are seeking in the Synod on Synodality. It certainly has not reversed the decline of Catholicism in Brazil, bit instead opened up the way for Evangelical Christianity to fill the gap.
Meanwhile, divisions also exist among Catholics, suggesting that the rise of Evangelical Christianity is one part of a bigger story about the divisions in Brazilian society, which intersect with race and income as well. But in a country where, according to the Datafolha institute, almost 60 per cent of people say religion was crucial to their choice of candidate, it was perhaps inevitable that sectarianism would emerge. Lula will likely find, as US President Biden did after the Trump years, that while many on the left rejected previous conservative-nationalist policies, those years nevertheless built up a formidable constituency – one which Lula, like Biden, now must contend with.
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